October 20, 2020

Week 10 Notes

Plan for Week 10 (in 5 parts):

Part I: Recap on subject/object naturalism.
Part II: Price's Second Move, with Misak's Two Moves
Part III: Blackburn's Two Essays, Eliaticism
Part IV: Kantian Categorial Expressivism
Part V: Price's Path from *Time's Arrow*

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Part I: **Recap on subject/object naturalism: Generalizing by "Dividing Through"**

Generalize the object-naturalism/subject-naturalism distinction by:
a) Putting in terms of 'vocabulary' vocabulary:
     i. Object naturalism considers a *representational semantic metavocabulary*, relating expressions of the target (problematic) vocabulary, thought of as representings or descriptions, to facts and objects represented by them. Both the latter and the representational relation are to be specified in a *naturalistic* vocabulary. So we have a naturalistic representational semantic metavocabulary.

     ii. Subject naturalism considers a *pragmatic metavocabulary* for the same problematic target vocabulary. That is a vocabulary in which one can specify what one needs to *do*—the practices one must engage in or the abilities one must exercise (the social and individual versions of pragmatics, respectively)—in order thereby to count as deploying the target vocabulary so as to confer on it the meanings that are specified in some semantic metavocabulary. Subject naturalism insists on a *naturalistic* pragmatic metavocabulary.

b) Redescription in this 'vocabulary' vocabulary shows how one could "**divide through by the naturalism**" in Price's scheme. Doing that would be relaxing the requirement:
     i. That **the *same* kind of vocabulary be used *both* for semantic *and* for pragmatic metavocabularies**. Maybe that is a good restriction to impose, but if so, why? What reasons are there to aspire to uniformity here? Why not employ different kinds of metavocabulary for the semantics than for the pragmatics?

     ii. **That the metavocabularies (semantic and pragmatic) be *naturalistic*.** Though there are good reasons to think this would be enlightening, and it engages with the motivations of those (like Jackson and Armstrong) who worry about placement or location problems, one can at least entertain the possibility of using other sorts of vocabularies as semantic or pragmatic

metavocabularies. For instance, one might think (on Kantian-Wittgensteinian grounds) that the *pragmatic* metavocabulary should be a *normative* vocabulary.

c) At this point we can also "**divide through by the representationalism**" that Price has argued is presupposed by object naturalism. So we might want to employ an *inferentialist*, rather than a *representationalist*, semantic metavocabulary.

d) If one
       i. uses a *normative* pragmatic metavocabulary and
       ii. understands the norms as instituted by social practices, in accord with **Rorty's social pragmatism about norms**, and
       iii. Uses an *inferentialist* semantic metavocabulary, and
       iv. Explains the *use* of representational vocabulary in terms of the normative pragmatic metavocabulary and the inferentialist semantic metavocabulary,
then one has the outlines of the theory presented in ***Making It Explicit***.

e) Note that other choices are available at every step of this process (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) above.
- So not only do we have a route from what Price makes of the pragmatism shared by Dewey, Wittgenstein, and Rorty, in redescribing it as subject naturalism, to *Making It Explicit,*
- We also have a map, a botanization of choice-points for other alternative theory-shapes.

f). If you generalize *all the way* (I want to say), and ask about the general features we should esteem or require in a *universal meta*metavocabulary for discussing the *relations between* semantic and pragmatic metavocabularies, we have the project of ***Between Saying and Doing***.

This is a recap of the big points from two weeks ago (subject naturalism / object naturalism) and the "dividing through" generalization from last week.

**Part II**: Price's Second Move, with Misak's Two Moves

Story from last week retold.
a). This is about Price's other large, important move.

      i) Besides redescribing antirepresentationalist pragmatism as subject naturalism,
      ii) he synthesizes it with Humean expressivism.

This is the story epitomized in the diagram below.

      Blackburn pioneered the idea that **Hume was** an expressivist about "morals and modals," and that, as such, he was **not a *skeptic* but a *naturalist*** about them. In the words Price would later give him, **he saw Hume as a *subject* naturalist, rather than a skeptic**. (One of the big contemporary divides in Hume scholarship asks whether he should be understood as a naturalist or a skeptic.)
      There is a pretty straight line between this sort of Humean expressivism and the pragmatist line from James through Dewey to Rorty.

Genealogy of Contemporary Neopragmatism

There is a space at the bottom in the center where I would dearly love to fill in **Hegel** as the missing figure. I think that would be right for Dewey and Rorty and me. But not at all for James. We would have to put his best friend and colleague Josiah Royce in there. Royce and James were C.I. Lewis's Doktorvaters, whom he synthesized in a Kantian way. And Hegel is

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hugely important for Peirce, too. And Hegel is not an influence on Price. Again, Rorty's relations to Kant are, as we have seen, complex and verging on the Freudian ("Kill the (beloved) father!"). And of course Rorty was strongly influenced by Sellars. So the diagram substantially oversimplifies things (go figure).

But I hope it helps make at least one important clear:

The large claim epitomized in the diagram is that
Huw's finding/making the ideological connection between
- **(Humean) expressivist antirepresentationalism and**
- **Pragmatist antirepresentationalism**

is an achievement of comparable significance to

Misak's dual insights:
- **Distinguishing the two wings of American pragmatism, and**
- **Bringing Cambridge pragmatism (to begin with, of the previous, Wittgenstein-Ramsey generation) together with it**.

Putting the Misak distinction together with the Pricean synthesis yields a genuinely transformative (Rortyan) redescription and (Hegelian) recollection of a tradition that looks very different afterwards than it did before.

My characterization of the result in terms of the distinction between **Humean expressivism** (the tradition Price was concerned with) and **Kantian categorial expressivism** is downstream from Misak's and Price's analytic and synthetic achievements (respectively), and meant to deepen the insights they have given us.

b) That diagram connects Huw's synthetic move with Misak's two big moves:

i) Distinguishing two different subtraditions within classical American pragmatism (and its continuation after Dewey): the James-Dewey-Rorty tradition and the Peirce-Lewis-Sellars/Quine tradition.

ii) Bringing alongside these two pragmatist subtraditions a third, Cambridge pragmatism, identified with Ramsey and Wittgenstein, and continued by Price (and Blackburn, once the Pricean synthesis has been factored in). **Misak is too modest to cite herself as a contemporary avatar of Cambridge pragmatism, but that she is**.

[Note that I am going to suggest that **McTaggart** should be at least considered as another Cambridge philosopher crucial for understanding this strand. I already invoked the "Cambridge changes" idea to illustrate Rortyan vocabulary-pragmatism. This is the idea that everything is similar to everything else in an infinite number of respects, and dissimilar to it in an infinite number of other respects. So a vocabulary must privilege some of these. If you think that any such privileging must reflect features of our practice, in a way that cannot be understood as *dictated* by or simply read off of how things objectively are, then you are a Rortyan pragmatist. And we will see that Price's path to Rortyan pragmatism starts with McTaggart on time

(mediated by Price's Cambridge *Doktorvater*—Misak's, too?—**Huw Mellor** (who just died in the past couple of weeks)). McTaggart was heavily influenced by and mostly identified with British Idealism, most notoriously because of his famous argument for the unreality of time.]

The story I am telling here interweaves historical redescription, retrospectively rationally reconstucting philosophical traditions (not just of the mighty dead, but of 30 or 40 years, bringing us up to contemporary work) with analytic redescription. This is Rortyan methodology, and it shows (contrary to his official expectations) that genuine philosophical progress *can* be made—and *how* it is made.

Part III: Blackburn's Two Essays

a) In the first reading for this week, "Landscapes of Pragmatism," Blackburn introduces the crucial **distinction between *global* and *local* antirepresentationalism or antidescriptivism**.

   This distinction is essential for understanding, and for sharpening, the task Price faces in synthesizing Rortyan pragmatist antirepresentationalism and Humean expressivist antirepresentationalism of the sort Blackburn epitomizes. (Gibbard is another.).

   This distinction substantially clarifies the debate between Rorty and some of his critics, like Blackburn and the arch-object-naturalists Jackson and Armstrong. As Price points out at the opening of one of the essays we read last week, they take it to be obvious that *some* uses of language have a principally representational point and nature. We *do* describe how things objectively are. Unlike Blackburn, they immediately jump to a *global* semantic rerpresentationalism. They are among the "descriptivists" that Sellars criticized on just these grounds.

   (Sellars is a paradigm of someone who is locally representationalist, about some vocabularies, and locally expressivist about others. More on his Kantian (pragmatic, metalinguistic) expressivism in Part IV.).

b) **Rorty himself never explicitly considers merely *local* forms of antirepresentationalism**— even though his hero Sellars is one. I suppose he thought that his criticisms of (in effect) representational semantic metavocabularies was sufficient to show the bankruptcy of appeals to representation *tout court*.

c) Another philosophical move Price makes here is to identify and isolate the commitment that is taken on, the challenge that must be taken up, by merely *local* representationalists (= merely local *anti*representationalists).

   This is what he calls (following Sellars's Pitt student Robert Kraut, who identifies the term, and maybe the point, as one of Rorty's [where in Rorty?]) **the *bifurcation* issue**.

   This is the question of **how to distinguish the vocabularies that should be given a descriptivist-representationalist semantic treatment and those that should not—those that should be given an expressivist, anthropological, subject-naturalist, or pragmatic treatment instead.**

   Blackburn has surprisingly little to say on this score. What he does have to say I will address below under the heading of "Eliaticism."

   i. One question that arises here concerns the nature of this distinction. Is it the case, for instance, that **the descriptive-representational vocabularies or uses are *basic* or *central* to discursive practice** in some way? Are the ones we should give alternative accounts of (pragmatist, expressivist, subject-naturalist, etc.) in some sense superstructural, in principle parasitic on the descriptive-representational ones? This is specifically what Wittgenstein means to deny in claiming that language does not have a "downtown."

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(We Kantian categorial local expressivists think OED vocabulary *is* basic. Compare the different—but not unrelated—sense in which we inferentialists claim that asserting, so also inferring, giving and challenging reasons, is "downtown" in discursive practice, in that having some performances with this significance is *criterial* for qualifying as *discursive* practice, as being a *Sprach*spiel. The relations between these two senses of "downtown" is complex, interesting, and important to unpack.).

ii. Another challenge for **bifurcationists is not falling into objectionable metaphysics** in characterizing the descriptive-representational vocabularies or regions of discourse. One would be doing that—running afoul of what Price and I take to be important Rortyan lessons—if one characterizes the genuinely descriptive-representational practices in ways that presuppose or underwrite **the privileging of some vocabularies as better or more accurate *just as representations***. For that idea will end up committing one to some version of "nature's own vocabulary." David Lewis is a paradigm of someone who makes this move, and embraces this conclusion.

Rorty warns us at a minimum that we must not think we can make ultimate sense of representation in a way that is not vocabulary-relative: a way that lets us stand, as it were, outside of all vocabularies and compare how good a job they are doing in representing how things objectively are. **The target of his criticism is the idea that there is a non-vocabulary-relative standard of assessment that goes with the idea of <u>representation</u> itself: a vocabulary being better worse just *as* representing how things objectively are. This is what he sometimes calls an "ideal of *accuracy* of representation."**
This is not an *epistemic* point. It is not the claim that we can't *know* how good a job our current vocabulary is doing. It is the claim that the idea of there being such a fact of the matter is ultimately unintelligible. This is what Price means—following Rorty—by talking about "big-'R' Representation," and distinguishing it from *both* i-representation *and* e-representation.
[**I was asked a question about this during last week's class, and did not give a good answer. I should be sure to make this point explicitly and clearly this time around**.]
I take it Price thinks he is just making explicit a critique of bifurcationism—and hence of merely local antirepresentationalism—that was implicit in Rorty. That might be right. After all, I've just identified the Rortyan line of thought such a critique might develop. But Rorty does not tease out these consequences explicitly, so it is an achievement of Price's to do so.

d) **Blackburn**, in his deceptively straightforward essay ("Landscapes...") anticipates the need to say something about the issue of bifurcation (without using this vocabulary that Price will introduce into the discussion later). He concedes that it cannot be addressed at the level of *semantics*, of talk of 'truth' and 'facts.' This is largely because of the semantic minimalism (deflationism) he shares with Huw, and that Price has taken to be central to the antirepresentationalist case.
He argues instead for **an *epistemological* criterion**: what Price and MacArthur call the **"Eleatic criterion**."

[It is called the **Eleatic Principle** after a passage from Plato's Sophist, in which the Eleatic stranger suggests that causal power is the mark of being. (Plato, 1935, 247d–e) David **Armstrong** cites this passage in *Universals and Scientific Realism* (Armstrong, 1978, Vol 2, 45–46).]

By the way, fans of this criterion, like Armstrong (in whom it is allied, not by mere coincidence, with object naturalism) typically take it to follow that things like norms and prices are not real by the Eleatic criterion. But is this clearly a consequence? These things matter to *us*, and *we* make causal differences. What if the only measuring instruments that can be causally affected by all sorts of "abstract" things (recall the skepticism I articulated a few weeks ago about whether this is really a kind of thing, as opposed to a way one vocabulary can be related to another) is concept-using humans? Armstrong will say that there is no story to be told about the "causal chains" connecting such things to us. But perhaps what is true is that they are not at all simple. What makes us sensitive to, for instance, the cruelty of someone else's act, involves all of our training in using a whole battery of concepts. Once so trained, we can perceive paradigmatic acts of cruelty *as* cruel. (What I call Sellars's "two-ply theory of observability" suggests a mechanism whereby this can be so.)

I think of it as generalized by **Harman**'s move, in distinguishing electrons from moral values on the basis that the best story about our 'electron'-talk involves invoking causal interactions with electrons, whereas the best explanation of our use of 'moral value'-talk need not step outside our attitudes.

Harman invokes "best explanation" rather than "causation," so his criterion is usefully broader than the Eleatic, while including the cases it would cover.

Blackburn's version is more general and useful still. For he asks whether, in characterizing the practices themselves—in a subject-naturalist/anthropological/ pragmatist pragmatic metavocabulary—we need to *use*, and not merely *mention*, the sentences and singular terms of the practice being characterized. Do we find ourselves *obliged* (Q: What are the rules of this game?) to say things like: they respond to K things by calling them 'K'?

Finally, the doings of the items of common sense are directly witnessed, reflected in experience or what Kant called intuition. Their whole life, as it were, consists in their role as systematizers and explainers of experience. There is therefore *no option of embracing the scheme, while holding back on its own explanations of why we do so.* Whereas in the other cases, there is every prospect of bracketing the existence of possible worlds and the rest, and coming to understand why we go in for the mode of thought in question in other terms. In other words, there is every prospect of giving an anthropology or genealogy which is itself free of the commitments in question.

This important move of Blackburn's is characteristic of his philosophic writing. It is a subtle and sophisticated move, that substantially advances the conversation (without pretending to settle things). And it is made not only without fanfare, but without marking it as a move at all. In this way, SB writes like Hume (no small compliment!). Compare Price, by contrast, part of

whose excellence as a philosophical writer consists precisely in marking explicitly the distinctions, conceptual suggestions, and criticisms that he is introducing.

Eliatic Strategies for E-Representation

Three grades (or strategies) of Eliaticism about achievement of semantic success, in making semantic contact with objective reality.
These are candidate readings of Price's place-holder metaconcept of "e-representation":
Using the locutions of the target vocabulary in:

1) *Causal* explanations of achievement of *knowledge* by using the target vocabulary.
2) Best explanations of the *success* of the practice (even if that success is only partial) involve use of the target vocabulary.
3) Pragmatic metavocabulary specification of the practice that is adequate for some other purpose [insert parameter here] makes essential use of the ground-level target vocabulary for which it is a metavocabulary.

Compare: David Lewis's frankly vocabulary-relative method for deciding what you are really talking about by using a target vocabulary:
i) Ramsify your target theory (maybe leaving causal or alethic modal terms unRamsified), then
ii) pick out best realizers of the functional roles so specified, with the realizers specified in one's favorite (privileged) base or use vocabulary.

This Ramsify + Realizers strategy incorporates a *double* dependence on vocabulary choice:
- First, one must pick which bits of *target* vocabulary to Ramsify (= replace with variables bound by quantifiers—typically at least second-order predicate variable, bound by wide-scope higher-order existential quantifiers) and which to hold fixed (e.g. but not necessarily, "causes").
- Then one must settle on a privileged *base* vocabulary in which to specify the proposed *realizers* of the functional roles defined by the Ramsified theory.

I have pointed out that the temptations for question-begging in the appeal to arguments of this *broadly Eliatic* form is great, since presuppositions can be hidden in one's not-explicitly-motivated implicit restrictions on the *vocabulary* one can appeal to in specifying what one is explaining and what one can appeal to in explaining it. This is particularly so with appeals to 'dispositions' to use expressions as the *explanandum*. One usually has in mind thereby dispositions to make noises under stimuli or in environments specified in a naturalistic vocabulary. But things look quite different if what one take to need explanation is one's disposition to use, say 'negation' *correctly*.

For vocabularies that raise puzzles, typically about how we can come to *know* about the sorts of facts and entities discussed in some vocabulary we should adopt the "anthropological" stance of explaining the *use* of the vocabulary, rather than assuming it is e-representational. Here functional pluralism should reign.

Cf. the Benacerraf diagnosis of the challenges in the philosophy of mathematics: one either has a good theory of mathematical *truth* or a good theory of mathematical *knowledge*, but not both.

SB is willing to be deflationist about truth, but not about knowledge. But whence the difference, on a properly pragmatist point of view? SB thinks some sort of "quasi-causation" must be invoked to explain knowledge of numbers or values or possibilities.

In any case, it is not clear to me that focusing on *knowledge* rather than on *truth* makes things easier here. **I can deflate <u>knowledge</u> as easily as <u>truth</u>**. That is precisely what the social-perspectival account of *attributions* of knowledge—as attributing a commitment (B), attributing entitlement to that commitment (J), and undertaking or endorsing that commitment (T), hence JTB—is supposed to do.

(Tell the **Benacerraf story about the philosophy of math** here: TwenCent philosophy of math divides for him into theories like Platonism, that are good on mathematical truth but terrible on mathematical knowledge, and theories like intuitionism or constructivism that are good on mathematical knowledge but terrible on mathematical truth.)

At any rate, I take Blackburn just to have opened the topic up here, and to have gestured in a direction, rather thany trying to offer a proper account. But that is not nothing. The discussion proceeds from here.

Blackburn's invocation of whether we need to *use*, rather than simply *mention*, the target vocabulary in our anthropological story in a *pragmatic* metavocabulary should be considered in connection with the dispute between Dummett and McDowell in the '80s about **"robust" vs. "modest" theories of meaning**. McDowell's plea for modes semantic theories is a plea for using *only* the expressions of the language one is giving a theory of meaning for in stating that theory. This debate in turn should be considered in the light of (and as having influenced) Dummett's later distinction between "theories of meaning" (which is where robustness is, he thinks, required) and "meaning theories" (where modesty might reign). The former tell you what meaning *is*, while the latter specify the actual meanings of expressions in some target vocabulary. [Note that this latter distinction might seem to some to be of the order of pointless subtlety of the political distinction within hard-left circles between "mass action" and "action by the masses." (The former can be directed "from above" by a vanguard party, and so is OK for Leninists, while the latter denotes something initiated "from below" and so is favored by Maoists, at the other end of that spectrum.) Dummett is no tankie, but he was familiar enough with the vocabulary deployed in these circles that he *might* have intended such a resonance, as a characteristic Oxbridge sort of joke.

e) I (as a Kantian-Sellarsian categorial, pragmatic metavocabulary expressivist) will take on the obligations

      i. To distinguish OED vocabulary from those about which I tell an expressivist story.

      ii. To justify its basicness and centrality, without falling into "big-'R' Representationalism,"

      iii. To give an account of its e-representational character (in terms of semantic governance by and epistemic tracking of what is represented), and

      iv. Then to explain how non-OED categorial pragmatic metavocabulary, whose principal expressive role is *not* to describe or explain—but to make explicit features of the framework of discursive practices that makes description and explanation possible (being LX for every ADP)—can, precisely in virtue of playing that distinctive categorial pragmatic expressive role, *also* acquire a secondary descriptive-representational role satisfying the conditions of semantic governance by (a deontic normative matter, that is, something that must be expressed in a deontic normative metavocabulary) and epistemic tracking of (an alethic modal matter, that is, something that must be expressed in an alethic modal metavocabulary) what are then discernible as *facts*, for instance, normative and modal facts.

f). Transition from "Landmarks..." to PASAS is from **local pragmatism-expressivism to global**, via rehearsal of strategies he cd use to live with the latter. This is a softening-up process, easing into acceptance. [Tell story of **cat/grandmother on the barn roof**.]

Part IV: Kantian Categorial Expressivism

In this way, the discussion of Blackburn leads into the discussion of **Kantian categorial expressivism**, and what I make of what Sellars makes of Carnap's specifically *metalinguistic* neoKantianism.
[Since this was left over from last time—planned as the final segment, but not reached before class ended—I had thought to start with it. But this way of leading up to it is better all around.]

For Blackburn, the issue of what vocabularies are to be given nonrepresentational semantic readings is open and unprincipled. Any we find problematic for some reason are candidates, no matter how varied the reason. I will give a principled way of distinguishing vocabularies that should be treated as *categorially expressive*. (They must be elaborated from and explicative of every autonomous discursive practice: LX for every ADP.)

Account of my *Kantian expressivism* (out of Sellars out of Carnap), that I didn't get to in Week 9.

Last week, and at the beginning today, I talked about how my distinction in *Between Saying and Doing* between semantic and pragmatic metavocabularies, and the idea of a *meta*metavocabulary for discussing the relations between them and between them and their target vocabularies, can be thought of as generalizing Price's object-naturalism/subject-naturalism distinction.

Here we look at *another* way in which *BSD* fills in fine structure of a Price-like account. Here I discuss my (neo)*Kantian expressivism*, and raise the sort of question Huw raises about the relation of *Humean* expressivism (HEX) to the exercises of offering explanations in a *normative* pragmatic metavocabulary (understood in accord with Rorty's social pragmatism about norms), in *MIE*. The final question is: what is the relation between the *Kantian* expressivism of *BSD* and my subsequent understanding of Sellars's version of Kant's categories in terms of pragmatic metavocabularies (inspired by Carnap, retailed in my *From Empiricism to Expressivism*), on the one hand, to the Humean expressivism that Huw synthesizes with Rortyan pragmatism, on the one hand, and my stories, on the other.

Telling this story is recollecting—rationally reconstructing in an expressively progressive way— where Huw and I were in our interacting understandings *circa* 2006—2013.

1. But I add in a reading of Kant's two great innovations:
    a) Notion of expressive role distinctive of categories.
    b) Idea that <u>intentionality</u> is a normative concept.
    c) Understanding content in terms of what we do (synthesize a transcendental unity of apperception). This is pragmatism as understanding semantics (content) in terms of pragmatics (use).

(b) then shows up as the idea that a pragmatic metavocabulary should be a normative vocabulary.

And (a) suggests that a different *kind* of concept is involved in pragmatic metavocabularies, at least insofar as they articulate the structure of the practices of describing-and-explaining.

Basic Idea: that besides concepts whose characteristic expressive job it is to describe and explain empirical goings-on, **there are concepts whose characteristic expressive job it is to make explicit necessary structural features of the discursive framework within which alone description and explanation are possible.**
[I am telling the story from my "On the Way to a Pragmatist Theory of the Categories," from the Introduction to *From Empiricism to Expressivism*.]

Punchline**: This is *Kantian* expressivism, rather than *Humean* expressivism**.

[It is possible that no-one has before ever used the expression "Kantian expressivism."]
It is Kant out of what Sellars made of Carnap (seeing Carnap, as Carnap could not see himself, as a neoKantian), and then taking the young Sellars's notion of <u>pragmatic metavocabulary</u> as the key to a contemporary version of the categories.
Rorty emphatically would *not* approve of this "transcendentalizing" way of looking for common necessary and sufficient conditions of discursive practice. This is attempting to teach the hedgehog pragmatism, when only the fox can understand it.
Rortyan fox-pragmatism goes along with HEX functional pluralism, as does Wittgenstein and the classical American pragmatists.
I am systematic and rationalistic, and specifically a Kantian rationalism, by contrast to the Humeanism of traditional pragmatism. But Hegel provides (go figure!) a path to *synthesizing* these strands of thought.

2. Challenge: synthesize the pragmatic/semantic metavocabulary way of thinking of things with Huw's subject/object naturalism.
Note that this is a *different* project than synthesizing my inferentialism with HEX.
(So maybe I should talk about the stages of that synthesis first—since Huw actually pursues it—and only get to my Kantian-Sellarsian expressivism later.)

7. **Kantian, categorial expressivism**:
   a) But my concern is not just with shifting methodological attention/priority to pragmatic metavocabularies over semantic ones, which is the pragmatism I diagnose Price and I as sharing.

b) It is equally with the idea that the expressive roles distinctive of pragmatic metavocabularies are different from and parasitic on the expressive roles of (what I call—tendentiously, in the context of this dispute with Price—"OED vocabulary") ordinary empirical descriptive vocabulary. I think of the distinction (following Sellars, following Carnap) as one of ground-level language and its (pragmatic) metalanguage.

c) One of Sellars's axial ideas, around which his whole thought revolves, and which ties together his entire corpus, is that **a successor-concept to Kantian categories can be found in *metalinguistic* concept**s. And though he is only intermittently clear about this (his grip on the point repeatedly slips, though it is firm at times, mostly in the earlier works), his practice shows he means ***pragmatic* metalanguages** (a term he does sometimes use). Here I have in mind, of course (as I have said in many places) the idea that Kant saw that, in addition to there being concepts whose defining expressive role it is to describe and explain (*represent*, in a sense that depends essentially on subjunctively robust, so explanation-supporting, broadly inferential relations of implication and incompatibility) empirical goings-on, there are concepts (expressions) whose distinctive expressive role it is to make explicit essential features of the practical framework within which, the practical background against which alone what we do is intelligible as describing and explaining (so, representing) empirical goings on. Paradigmatic among these are alethic modal concepts expressing necessity (which must, in turn, be understood in terms of the deontic normative metaconcept of <u>rulishness</u>, in a sense that makes essential reference to the normative governance of our (synthetic) *doings*).

d) I want to offer a *principled* way of distinguishing respectable, important vocabularies that should *not*, in the first instance, be taken to play descriptive or representational roles from the rest: they are all and only those playing framework-explicating ("categorial" in Kant's sense) expressive roles. **This is a principled way of doing what Blackburn does only piecemeal**. And which, I am claiming, *global* expressivism overshoots.

e) The sense in which I call myself an "expressivist" is at some distance from that of Humean expressivism, the HEX that Price understands in terms of a reading of Blackburn's reading of Hume. For I am in the first instance an expressivist about the expressive roles characteristically played by the locutions of pragmatic metavocabularies.

f) By contrast, though Huw's "subject naturalism" is, I claim, to be understood in terms of the notion of a <u>pragmatic metavocabulary</u>, his *naturalism*—what I "divide through by" to get my generalization of the subject naturalism/object naturalism distinction to that between pragmatic and semantic metavocabularies—lets him think that the very same naturalistic vocabulary we (can) use at what for me is the ground level is all that is needed for pragmatic metavocabularies. No new kind of vocabulary, no distinctive

functional expressive roles, are needed to move to the level of (pragmatic) *meta*vocabularies.

g) The paradigm for me of the distinctive expressive role bits of pragmatic metavocabulary must play is two-fold:

i. *Normative* vocabulary, making explicit proprieties of *use* of expressions. (Note that putting it in terms of "proprieties" is strictly only appropriate to single-sorted normative metavocabularies, which mimic truth-conditional semantic metavocabularies in having only a single on/off normative status: correct/incorrect, proper/improper, assertible/not assertible. One of my central theoretical innovations in the vicinity is exploring the substantial increase in expressive power a pragmatic metavocabulary gets if it is two-sorted, distinguishing *commitment* and *entitlement* (as in *MIE*) or *responsibility* and *authority* (as in *ASoT*). In both cases these take on/off evaluations (committed/not committed, entitled/not-entitled, responsible/not responsible, authoritative/not authoritative). And in both cases, in my telling of the story, in keeping with the social pragmatism about normativity I inherit from Rorty, and my commitment to social perspectiveal I/thou rather than individual/communal I/we reading of the social, these normative *statuses* are understood as the objects of two sorts of complementary, social-perspectival normative *attitudes*. They can be *attributed* (to *another*) or *undertaken* or *acknowledged* (claimed) *oneself*.)

ii. **Logical** **vocabulary** (in the very broad sense in which I use that term). Its distinctive expressive role is to make explicit the broadly inferential relations of implication (being a reason for) and incompatiblity (being a reason against) that, according to the semantic inferentialist model of conceptual contents that are expressed by *non*logial vocabulary. The paradigm of such ground-level, prelogical vocabulary is OED vocabulary.

In my broad usage, alethic modal vocabulary, making explicit subjunctively robust relations of necessitation and exclusion, counts as 'logical' in this expressive sense.

I think of logical vocabulary as the *organ of semantic self-consciousness*, since it is what lets us make explicit, in the form of claims (claimables), the broadly inferential relations in virtue of which ground-level OED vocabulary has the conceptual content it does.

The paradigm is *conditionals*, that let us *say* what (materially, not yet by logic or form) follows from (implies) what, and negation, which lets us *say* what is (materially, not yet by logic or form) incompatible with what.

I appeal to this distinctive expressive role to address the *demarcation* problem in the philosophy of logic: the task of distinguishing specifically *logical* vocabulary. Once we can do that, we can distinguish implications and incompatibilities that hold "**in virtue of logical form alone**," as we have come to say. Those are the implications/incompatibilities that (i) hold materially, and (ii) are robust (remain good) under arbitrary *substitution* of nonlogical for nonlogical vocabulary.

g). This picture (and reading of what we should make today of Kant's discovery, as I want to say, of the categories, "pure concepts of the Understanding," as framework-articulating or framework-expressing concepts) involves both

i.   Commitment to transcendental, systematic thinking about discursive practice as such, in the form of thinking about features common to *any* adequate pragmatic metavocabulary, so, to the **platonist hedgehog fan of principles** rather than the **pragmatist fox fan of practices**. And

ii.   Commitment to a substantial expressive *bifurcationism*. For it has at its core a distinction between two essentially different kinds of expressive role vocabularies (and bits of vocabulary) can play: ground-level descriptive-explanatory, and in a pragmatic metavocabulary.

Both of these are in tension with, or simply contradict essential features of Price's version of pragmatism-as-global-expressivism, as an antirepresentationalist strategy.

For one thing, distinguishing ground-level and pragmatic metalevel expressive roles rules out (directly contradicts) Price's strategy of adopting the negative thesis of, for instance semantic minimalism (its deflationism) but not its positive thesis, which depends on a contrast with descriptive-representational uses of vocabulary.

h) One way to improve the situation, to narrow the gap between *this* sort of expressivism (call it BEX2: expressivism about pragmatic metavocabularies) and Price's view would be to

i.   Maintain the distinction between ground-level [best to avoid the terminology of "object language" so as not to invite confusion concerning its relation to "object naturalism"] vocabulary and metavocabularies, including especially *pragmatic* metavocabularies that let us talk about (say what) one must *do* in order to be using ground-level vocabulary, so as to confer on it by so using it (by using it as subject to those norms) the conceptual contents it has (expresses). This much bifurcation of expressive roles is unavoidable for BEX2.

ii.   But do not think of the ground level as ordinary, empirical, *descriptive* (OED) vocabulary. The commitment to the ground-level role being understood as *description* (which presupposes, Sellars teaches us that Kant taught us, a co-ordinate explanatory role, so involvement in subjunctively robust relations of implication and incompatibility) is an additional, optional commitment that goes beyond what is entailed by (i).

For what matters for (i) is that there is no (other) vocabulary that stands to ground-level vocabulary as ground-level vocabulary stands to a pragmatic metavocabulary for it. A pragmatic metavocabulary, by definition, lets us *say* what we are *doing* (must do) in *using* the ground-level vocabulary. A pragmatic metavocabulary addressses the use of some *other*

vocabulary, the one it is a pragmatic metavocabulary *for*. Ground-level vocabularies, by definition, do not stand in this metalinguistic relation to any other vocabulary.

And the point above is then that we can say that much, can make the distinction of levels in those terms, without committing ourselves as to what the expressive role of ground-level vocabulary is. In particular, we need not commit ourselves to understanding it on a descriptive-representational semantic model.

8. What would be required to vindicate the claim that ground-level vocabularies-in-use (note that "vocabularies" is *always* supposed to be elliptical for "vocabularies-in-use"—it is never just the words, the "sign designs" in Sellars terminology, that we talk about as a vocabulary) should be thought of as at least having at their center and as an essential element ordinary empirical *descriptive* (OED) vocabulary—that every *autonomous discursive practice* (ADP), every language game one could play though one played no other, includes the use of OED vocabulary—is in no small part a way of discriminating the activity of describing. This would be saying, in a suitable pragmatic metavocabulary, what one needs to be *doing* in order thereby to count as *describing*, in a sense that is *narrower* than the merely declarative. To do that would be, in effect, to adumbrate a sense of "e-representation" that is more committtive than the deflated declarativist notion of <u>i-representation</u>. Doing that is accepting the *bifurcationist challenge*. It is defending what Price calls the "positive thesis" of semantic minimalism, by specifying the descriptive role that deflationists are *denying* traditional semantic 'truth'-talk and 'reference'-talk plays.

I will do so (in a story for another time) by appealing to the dual conditions of vocabulary use that satisfies the **dual conditions of *epistemically tracking* and *being semantically governed by* what it thereby counts as describing or representing.** The first is a relation specifiable in *alethic modal* vocabulary of subjunctive conditionals specifying reliable dispositions. The second is a relation specifiable in *deontic normative* vocabulary of authority and responsibility, of functioning as a standard for assessments of correctness (and entitlement to commitments). The use of the latter, normative vocabulary, should and will be understood in ways that accord with Rorty's social pragmatism about normative statuses.

9. A further (substantial) complication is that I take it that pragmatic and semantic metavocabulary playing its distinctive framework-explicitating expressive role (paradigmatically, alethic modal and deontic normative vocabulary) can play a genuinely descriptive-representational role, too. This fact means that we can understand there as being necessities (such as, but not limited to those expressed by "laws of nature") and norms (normative statuses: proprieties (in the one-sorted case) or commitments and entitlements or authority and responsibility (in the two-sorted case). The difference between the descriptive role played by vocabulary that is framework-explicating in the sense of being LX for every ADP and OED vocabulary is that in the case of the broadly logical vocabulary, that descriptive role is parasitic on and derivative from, in principle intelligible only in terms of its primary expressive role and (so) relation to the use of the ground-level OED vocabulary for which it is a metavocabulary.

There is no denying that this complication muddies the waters somewhat, for it articulates an additional level of complexity in contrasting OED vocabulary and vocabulary that is LX for it.

[I introduce this idea in "Modal Expressivism and Modal Realism: Together Again."]

10. In responding to the bifurcationist challenge of saying, in a pragmatic metavocabulary, what one needs to *do* in order to count thereby as *describing*, in an e-representational sense that is narrower than the deflationary declarativist i-representational sense (as gestured at in (8) above) and then adding a story about how vocabulary playing an essentially *meta*linguistic expressive role (being LX for every ADP) can nonetheless, in virtue of playing that role distinguishing it from the OED vocabulary it is a metavocabulary for, play a *derivative* narrowly descriptive role (as gestured at in (9) above), I am adding two further layers of complexity on the picture Price offers and endorses. I claim that these added layers are required by the phenomena, rather than just by love of complexity for its own sake. (But I would, wouldn't I?)

What I am calling "Kantian expressivism," (and will discuss a bit later in this session) by contrast, emerges from the Peirce-Lewis-Sellars wing of pragmatism (dividing things up according to Misak's invaluable botanization). It emerges full-blown in what Sellars makes of Kant's categories in the light of Carnap's metalinguistic turn. (And Carnap's pragmatism is a hitherto insufficiently appreciated influence on Quine.).

I aim to synthesize the Kantian categorial expressivism (which looks to pragmatic metavocabularies to express concepts LX for every ADP) with the rejection of representationalism and descriptivism (already in Sellars) that is behind Rorty's introduction of the post-Quinean 'vocabulary' vocabulary.

So **I am urging that we look at Misak's two wings of American pragmatism through the lens of their lining up with and issuing in the latest versions of Humean naturalistic and Kantian categorial expressivism. Thought of in these terms, the Cambridge pragmatism of the current generation, Blackburn and Price, as well as that of the later, antirepresentationalist Wittgenstein, belong on the Humean expressivism as subject naturalism side, rather than the Kantian categorial expressivism as social normative pragmatic metavocabulary side, which is not so committed to naturalism.** (Is it awkward for this thought that Sellars was an object naturalist? Also, CSP is a "habit naturalist" or a "selectional mechanisms" (learning and evolution) naturalist, but not an antirepresentationalist. He is an object naturalist, in the broad sense of "naturalist" he pioneered.

Dewey is an arch subject naturalist, which is as it should be on this way of lining things up.

The aim to discern categorial, framework-explicating, concepts defines a unique kind of expressivism.   For categorial concepts are those that express (not describe) concepts that articulate the practical framework that makes empirical description and explanation possible. ("Within which *alone* it is possible to describe and explain."). This is exactly the sort of transcendental, universalizing thought that the James-Dewey-Rorty wing of pragmatism rejects and abhors. It is characteristic of all of Peirce, Lewis, and Sellars, though. On this point, I'm

with them, as a Kantian categorial expressivist. This kind of expressivism is subject naturalist only if one "divides through by the naturalism," by reinterpreting Price's distinction between subject and object naturalism in terms of pragmatic and semantic metavocabularies, and then not insisting that the *meta*metavocabulary in which one addresses the relations between these two kinds of metavocabularies itself be a naturalistic one. I combine this line of thought from the Kantian side with Rorty's 'vocabulary' vocabulary, not only by putting things in the terms I just did, but also by offering a normative pragmatic metavocabulary and understanding those those norms in social-practical terms in my preferred metametavocabulary of meaning-use analysis.

I should tell the story about Kantian categorial expressivism first.
Then should follow up by mapping it onto the two wings of pragmatism Misak so usefully discerns.
Cambridge pragmatism, both in the Wittgenstein generation and in the Blackburn-Price generation, belongs firmly on the Humean expressivism, James-Dewey-Rorty pragmatism side.

Part V: Price's Path from *Time's Arrow*

[Mention that I've put the ToC, Introduction and the first and concluding chapters of *Time's Arrow* in the "Suggested Reading" section for this week, for anyone who wants to go a little deeper into this bit.]

Didn't get to this material in Week 10.
It is carried over to Week 11.

***Time's Arrow*, and Price's path from there to pragmatism as subject naturalism and expressivism**.